Western University

Scholarship@Western
Aboriginal Policy Research Consortium International (APRCi)

2010

The Treaty Annuity as Livelihood Assistance and
Relationship Renewal
Erik Anderson

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/aprci
Part of the Social Policy Commons
Citation of this paper:
Anderson, Erik, "The Treaty Annuity as Livelihood Assistance and Relationship Renewal" (2010). Aboriginal Policy Research
Consortium International (APRCi). 74.
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/aprci/74

5

The Treaty Annuity as Livelihood
Assistance and Relationship
Renewal
Erik Anderson

Introduction
Of all federal benefits, the treaty annuity payment is perhaps the most difficult
to understand and justify in a modern context. Every year, Indian and Northern
Affairs Canada (INAC) distributes four or five dollars to individual registered
Indians who are either members of, or affiliated with, First Nations that signed
historic treaties with the Crown. Under terms of thirteen treaties signed between
1850 and 1921, covering over half of the land mass of Canada, these annual
payments are made to over three hundred thousand registered Indians from
approximately three hundred First Nations. Clearly the purchasing power of four
or five dollars in today’s terms is insignificant, and far less than its value at the
time the treaties were signed.1
For the federal government, this payment represents partial fulfilment of
ongoing treaty obligations in exchange for surrendered Indian title to land—what
amounts to a legal obligation of a contractual nature. First Nations, however, have
often characterized the treaty annuity as renewal of a nation-to-nation agreement
to share the land in exchange for assurances of livelihood assistance for themselves
and future generations. This paper examines the extent of discussion and debate
concerning the annuity payment as support for Aboriginal livelihood leading up
to and during treaty negotiations, and afterwards as part of treaty implementation.
In this regard, the annuities must be understood in the context of the overall treaty
bundle of benefits designed to assist First Nations to either maintain existing
means of livelihood or transition to new means of survival in a changing world.
The rationale for the annuity, as well as its significance as an economic benefit,
is examined in some detail, including its value in today’s dollars. The evidence is
clear that both sides of the treaty relationship viewed the provision for livelihood
assistance into the future as an important objective of the treaties.
The historical and modern meaning of the annuity as relationship renewal and
as an annual reminder of obligations and promises is also examined. The consistency and regularity of the annuity payment in many ways remains at the heart of
the treaty relationship between First Nations and the federal government. It speaks
to an ongoing obligation to honour what are often characterized from the First
Nation perspective as sacred agreements. It further lends an air of immediacy to
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these historical documents and represents a yearly renewal of the treaty relationship, which accords well with the First Nation perspective of the treaties as sacred
“living” agreements. Here, the parties to the treaties differed significantly in their
views. While government assumed that the terms of treaty were fully bound up in
unchanging perpetuity in the written text, First Nations assumed that treaty terms
could be reviewed and renegotiated as part of relationship or treaty renewal.

Rationale for the Treaty Annuity
Any discussion of the rationale for the annuity must begin with a discussion of
the broader rationale for land surrender treaties, as required by the Royal Proclamation of 1763. The Royal Proclamation was written in large part in reaction to
settler expansion of the Thirteen Colonies, and formally recognized Aboriginal
land rights by stating that Indian lands could only be taken up for settlement
purposes through formal purchase by representatives of the British Crown. It
came to be understood, in effect, as a policy directive governing future purchases
of First Nation land. The Crown’s primary motivation to negotiate land surrender
treaties was essentially an exercise in imperialism—whether to open up new lands
for settlement or to access natural resources or otherwise secure a right-of-way.
The Aboriginal motivation generally included a desire to formalize relations of
peace and proactively negotiate assistance for future generations in recognition of
inevitable and rapid change.
Beginning in the early 1800s, there was another motivating factor that impacted
the Crown’s approach to dealing with First Nations that had partly to do with
developing philanthropic and humanitarian ideologies. Where First Nations had
once been considered critical military allies of both the French and British Crowns,
after the War of 1812, the British Crown began to see First Nations increasingly as
a burden. They not only represented a growing expense on the Imperial Treasury
as their traditional means of livelihood came under threat from competing land
and resource interests, but were also in possession of large tracts of land wanted
for settlement or other colonialist activity. The solution was seen to reside in a
program of “civilization” where the goal was to assimilate the Aboriginal nations
through means of education and agriculture, including removal to agricultural
settlements.2 Some government officials and humanitarian groups also began at
this time to perceive First Nations as a doomed people, and the “civilization”
program as the best, and perhaps only, means to secure their future. The treaty
annuity policy itself would come to play a significant role in supporting the civilization program.
The policy shift from larger one-time treaty payments to smaller annual expenditures in exchange for First Nation lands occurred in 1818.3 There are two distinct
reasons for this change in policy. The first had to do with cutting costs and general
financial retrenchment. There was constant pressure from Britain throughout the
first half of the nineteenth century to transfer the costs of administering Indian
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affairs to the colonial government, including, after 1818, the costs associated with
land surrender treaties. Part of these discussions inevitably included schemes to
self-finance the Indian administration through sales of Indian land.4 In 1819, Lieutenant-Governor Peregrine Maitland promoted a plan to self-finance the costs of
these land purchases. He reasoned that if government could privately sell some
of the land received through treaty at auction, using a method that included a
mortgage with a 10 percent down payment, the interest from the down payments
could then be used to finance the annuity.5 Maitland, however, soon realized that
current land values could not support this scheme and was forced instead to ask
the Imperial Treasury to assume the annual treaty expenditure.6
The other significant motivation for changing from a one-time payment to
perpetual annuity had to do with the well-being of the Aboriginal treaty signatories. Colonial Secretary Lord Bathurst argued in 1816 that one-time payments
did not result in a lasting benefit, and that annual payments would better address
ongoing Aboriginal welfare needs.7 Government officials recognized that First
Nations would require another source of income as their traditional means of
livelihood came increasingly under threat.8 Annuities had been part of the treatymaking process in the United States since the Canandaigua Treaty of 1794, where
they were intended to provide “the means of subsistence in agriculture and arts, as
well as their improvement in … civilization.”9 The first use of annuities as part of
treaty terms in British Canada appeared in 1818 in the Adjetance, Rice Lake, and
Lake Simcoe-Nottawasaga Treaties, followed closely by the Rideau, Longwoods,
and Huron Tract Purchases of the early 1820s.10
There is no evidence that Aboriginal people were consulted about the change of
payment and not much indication of their views when officials first explained the
changes.11 Certainly government officials sold the change as a lasting economic
advantage in contrast to the one-time payment, and it is likely that the changes
were received favourably. Aboriginal leaders had long expressed fear for their
people’s future, especially their ability to continue to make a living from traditional pursuits. They not only made specific requests for annual payments as part
of later pre-Confederation treaties, but seemed to be well aware of the annuity
terms offered in the American treaties, and often argued vociferously for similar
terms. Further, there was a long-standing precedent of Aboriginal gift diplomacy
that had been adopted by colonial governments to establish or maintain military
alliance with First Nations.12 An annual distribution of presents represented
renewal of these alliances, and even though Aboriginal leaders would later insist
that annuities and presents be considered separately, the notion of an annual distribution to reaffirm relations between nations was not a foreign one, having been an
Aboriginal pre-contact practice that was later adapted to by traders and government officials.13
Annuities were not the only form of regular payment that was discussed prior
to Confederation in terms of providing welfare assistance for First Nations. The
annual presents were also considered important in this regard. Between 1816 and
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1860 a number of commissions were established and proposals made with a view
to limit the Indian expenditure, especially with regards to the annual presents.14
Invariably, measures to end the practice of annual presents were met with strong
opposition from First Nations, and from certain government officials familiar with
First Nation diplomacy. They argued that the presents were not only crucial to
honour past military alliance and maintain future loyalty, but were also necessary
on humanitarian grounds for the economic well-being of First Nations.15 For
example, the Bagot Commission report of 1847 recommended that Indian presents
be continued for First Nations residents in the Canadas because treaty annuities
and the sale of lands were not yet sufficient to finance either their welfare or the
civilization program.16
While the annuity policy was contemplated in the context of ongoing support
for First Nations, the annuity amount was at base a payment for land, and was
often perceived by representatives on both sides of the negotiations in terms of
the relative value of the land. The link between land sales and treaty annuity
expenses began with Maitland’s scheme to self-finance the annuity in 1819, and
was later explicitly made in three land surrender treaties post-1850, the largest
being the Manitoulin Island Treaty of 1862,17 where a provision was included to
base the annuity amount directly on the interest earned on land sales.18 Aboriginal
negotiators also understood the link that government officials made between the
annuity amount and their particular means of valuing the land in terms of agricultural or mineral worth. In 1846 Ojibwa brought copper ore and coal to government officials in order to argue the value of the land.19 During the negotiations for
the Robinson-Huron Treaties and Treaty 3, chiefs insisted on an annuity amount
commensurate with the potential value from the recent discovery of minerals on
their lands.20 Conversely, following the difficult Treaty 3 negotiations, the First
Nations who had signed Treaties 1 and 2 complained that their annuity amount
should not have been less than the Treaty 3 amount given that their lands were of
greater agricultural value.21

The Evolution of the Annuity as an Economic Benefit
It is clear from the historical evidence that at different times both Aboriginal and
government representatives at the treaty discussions intended and perceived the
annuity to be a significant economic benefit. Furthermore, if the annuity was at
base a payment for land, negotiations over the annuity amount tended to focus
more on economic need than land valuation.22 This section will examine the initial
use of the annuity to assist the government’s civilization program, and how that
concept evolved with the later western treaties, including use of the annuity to
attempt to control behaviour. First Nation perceptions are also examined, namely
the expectation that the annuity and other treaty benefits would be sufficient to
assist them to provide for themselves and their families in the future. The expectation from both parties was that the annuity would assist in transitioning from
a hunting and trapping economy to one based on agriculture, or supplement
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the continuation of a traditional hunting and fur trade economy.23 Government
officials often thought of the annuity as a form of necessary support, at least until
such time as First Nations were able to be more self-sufficient and live without
treaty assistance through a policy of enfranchisement.
Increasingly in the 1800s missionaries and other humanitarian groups, such as
the Aborigines Protection Association, began to lobby governments to support
programs to protect and assimilate First Nations through religious and agricultural
education.24 After the inception of annuities in 1818, various levels of government
and government commissions considered the use of the annuity to fund a program
of civilization. The traditional resource base of many First Nations in southern
Ontario had already been significantly eroded, and the idea was to use the annuity
to help First Nations transition from a hunting- and trapping-based economy to an
agrarian economy, ultimately reducing any future welfare expenditure. In 1828,
Major General Henry Darling, who was asked to investigate the Indian Department, argued that the proposed Indian civilization program could be financed
by using annuity payments and a portion of the annual presents to pay for such
related items as schools, houses, roads, farm stock, agricultural equipment, and
seed.25 In 1829, under the leadership of Lieutenant-Governor Sir John Colborne,
the annuities began to be credited to band accounts, along with money from the
sales and leases of Indian lands, where it was used to promote the civilization
program, and specifically towards the creation of settlements at Coldwater, the
Narrows, St. Clair, and Munceytown.26
Prior to 1829, the payment of annuities in goods was favoured over cash as a
means to encourage agriculture and civilization. In some of the earlier treaties
government officials refused chiefs’ requests that annuities be paid in cash from
a paternalistic view that the money would be squandered instead of provide for
tangible economic benefits. Government had a firm notion of the types of goods
and services it felt should be financed by the annuity. Superintendent of Indian
Affairs Samuel Peters Jarvis told the Legislative Committee in 1839–1840 that the
practice of purchasing agricultural implements with the annuity money “seem[s]
at first to have been unwillingly adopted, but the tribes now convinced that it is
the most beneficial to their interests.”27
Chiefs, of course, had their own ideas of the best use of annuities and other
resources, and were also known to ask for goods instead of cash. Toward midcentury, chiefs began increasingly to demand assistance in education and agriculture as part of treaty terms. For example, Chief Peau de Chat, as part of the
Robinson-Huron Treaty negotiations in 1849, wanted government to pay for a
schoolmaster, a doctor, a blacksmith, a carpenter, a magistrate, and an agricultural instructor. Aboriginal leaders were pragmatic about their peoples’ future in a
changing world. They required assurances that they could hunt, fish, and trap on
their lands as they had always done, but also insisted on treaty terms sufficient to
help those who chose to settle down and farm.
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In fact, the Aboriginal ability to negotiate the annuity amount, according to the
available historical evidence, appears greater after 1850, and is especially evident
for the Robinson Treaties, and Treaties 1 and 3, which set the tone for all future
treaties, to Treaty 11 in the early 1920s.28 When Lieutenant-Governor Archibald
met with the Ojibwa in Manitoba in 1870 as part of Treaty 1 negotiations, he
was immediately given two demands by Chief Prince for compensation. The first
was to honour a former treaty commitment made by Lord Selkirk in 1817 for an
annual distribution of one hundred pounds of tobacco for each of two nations,
and the second was for Ojibwa loyalty during the recent Métis uprising.29 When,
by the spring of 1871, there was still no treaty or compensation, Ojibwa chiefs
posted a notice on the church door that settlers would no longer be permitted
to take up land without first negotiating a treaty. That summer, the journal The
Manitoban reported difficult negotiations, which ultimately resulted in an annuity
greater than what had been authorized by Ottawa, as well as a long list of other
items, from clothes to livestock to chiefs’ buggies, which would later come to be
known as the “outside promises.” 30
Treaty 3 negotiations for lands in Ontario west of the Great Lakes took four
seasons and resulted in a renegotiation and an increase to the three-dollar annuity
provided in Treaties 1 and 2. In 1869, after surveying the situation in the context
of the Métis uprising, Simon Dawson strongly advised that diplomatic arrangements be made with the Salteaux of Lake of the Woods for their consent in order
to ensure future safe passage across their lands.31 Negotiations began in 1870 with
an initial demand from the Salteaux Chiefs for a ten-dollar per capita annuity
for a right-of-way only. The following summer, government negotiators were
instructed to negotiate a full land surrender treaty, but only managed to settle past
claims through the distribution of provisions and clothing and a three-dollar per
capita payment. Nor were they any more successful in the third season of negotiations, when the Salteaux insisted on an increase to the three-dollar annuity offered
in Treaties 1 and 2, and refused to accept Treaty Commissioner Simpson’s offer of
doubling this amount for the first year and including annual salaries of twenty-five
and fifteen dollars for chiefs and headmen respectively. In 1873, annuity amounts
were increased to ten dollars for the first year, including a five-dollar “gratuity,”
and five dollars thereafter. The offer was again refused, and a counter-offer was
made by the Salteaux in the form of an older petition listing twenty demands,
including more than a doubling of the amounts offered to date.32 The impasse was
finally broken when one chief stepped forward to indicate his desire to treat on
terms less than the twenty written demands, and others followed suit. The final
terms included a twelve dollar gratuity for the first year followed by a five dollar
annuity, as well as an annual budget of one thousand five hundred dollars for the
purchase of ammunition and twine, twenty-five dollar annual salary for the chief
(one per band) and fifteen dollars for the headmen (three per band), along with a
number of agricultural items.
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After Treaty 3, the annuity amount remained relatively fixed and the most
contentious negotiations focused on other items that chiefs were able to include
as part of treaty terms, such as agricultural implements, grain, and cattle, as well
as education, instruction, and health care. Another topic of considerable concern
for First Nations was whether, after the treaties were signed, they would be able to
freely hunt, fish, and trap as they had always done. It should be kept in mind that
while much of the focus of the negotiations may have shifted from the annuity to
other items in the later Numbered Treaties, the discussion remained largely one of
the extent of government assurances of livelihood support in exchange for land, a
topic that was very much open to negotiation.
It is clear that the Aboriginal treaty signatories viewed the annuity as a significant economic benefit, and had expectations that the treaty terms, including the
annuity amount, would be sufficient ongoing government livelihood support in
exchange for land. 33 As historian Jean Friesen put it: “The only price which could
balance the loss of such property was the assurance of full economic security.”34
Ojibwa Chief Wa-sus-koo-koon of the Treaty 1 negotiations argued that a threedollar annuity was not enough to live on should they settle down to farm, and thus
requested that a house be built and furnished, and a plough and cattle provided for
each Ojibwa who decided to farm.35 Saulteaux Chief Ma-we-do-pe-nais justified
the twenty written demands during Treaty 3 negotiations as necessary “so that
we may be able to support our families as long as the sun rises and the water
runs.” 36
There are many examples throughout the nineteenth century of government
officials characterizing the annuities as important economic support for Aboriginal livelihood. Government reports of treaty negotiations often contain reference
to destitute First Nations who would benefit from taking treaty. Treaty Commissioner Simpson had characterized the annuity during Treaty 1 negotiations in 1871
as a “bounty” that would give the Aboriginal signatories an economic advantage
over the white settlers.37 He also used the following justification for limiting the
annuity to three dollars: “The sum of three dollars does not appear to be large
enough to enable an Indian to provide for himself with many of his winter necessities, but as he receives the same amount for his wife or wives, and for each of
his children, the aggregate sum is usually sufficient to procure many comforts for
his family.”38 He later wrote in his report of Treaties 1 and 2 that the First Nations
“are fully impressed with the idea that the amelioration of their present condition
is one of the objects of Her Majesty in making these treaties.” 39 Alexander Morris
noted in his treaty report of 1873 that he had explained to the Saulteaux Chief Mawe-do-pe-nais that the terms of the treaty were to “put into their hands the means
of providing for themselves and their families at home.”40
Morris often spoke of the well-being of children, and of “children’s children”
during negotiations, which was a powerful expression that future generations
would be looked after under the treaty relationship.41 Morris stated on the third
day of Treaty 3 negotiations in 1873: “I only ask you to think for yourselves,
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and for your families, and for your children and children’s children,”42 and on
the fourth and sixth days of Treaty 4 negotiations respectively: “The promises
we have to make to you are … not only for you but for your children born and
unborn,” and “it is for you now to act … whether or not you will … let your
children grow up and do nothing to keep off the hunger and the cold that is before
them.”43 And again, he emphasized during Treaty 6 negotiations: “I would like
your children to be able to find food for themselves and their children that come
after them,”44 and “I have told you that the money I have offered you would be
paid to you and to your children’s children.”45 It was the annual payment of the
annuity that most outwardly represented the assurances that future generations
would be looked after.
In correspondence regarding implementation of the treaty and annuity, there is
occasional mention of the necessity of the annuity, or for advances made against
the annuity, to carry certain families over winter.46 Mostly, however, the annuity
was seen as an important aspect of an overall livelihood strategy, along with
other means such as the raising of grain, selling of cattle, traditional pursuits,
and seasonal employment. A typical entry from an Indian Affairs annual report
reads: “The members of this band do little grain-raising, depending more upon
their income derived from each annuity, hunting, fishing and working for lumber
camps, and at various occupations.”47
Given that the annuity was understood by government officials in the context
of livelihood assistance, how the money was spent was of considerable concern
throughout the nineteenth century as part of treaty implementation. The annual
reports are full of commentary on how the annuity money was being used, or
should be used, and how government policy and practices should direct the
spending of annuities. For example, many officials argued for a policy of payment
closer to the reserves, away from settlements where annuities could be spent on
“useless or injurious articles.”48 Regulations were created to attempt to control
the purchase of goods, including the prohibition of certain items described as
“trinkets” or “gewgaws,” as well as alcohol. A policy was further instituted that
required prospective traders to apply for a licence from government in order to sell
their goods during annuity payment periods.49 There was also ongoing discussion
in the annual reports as to whether government should revert to paying annuities
in goods of lasting utility, such as agricultural items, instead of in cash.
Indian agents were asked to report specifically on the use of the annuity, and
there are consistent entries that indicate whether, in the opinion of the agent, the
annuity was spent wisely on items that could assist with attaining a livelihood,
especially over the winter months. The following is fairly typical: “I visited
Macleod the next day and found them spending their money in a judicious manner.
A goodly number of cooking and heating stoves were bought and also furniture
and the usual supply of warm clothing for themselves and families.”50 The Indian
commissioner for Manitoba and the Northwest Territories explained that the
annuity payments were initially made in the springtime, but were moved closer
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to winter because families had been in the habit of wasting their spring annuities,
leaving them unprepared for the coming winter “in the form of clothing etc.”51
Annuities were sometimes specifically targeted to programs of agriculture or
education. For example, annuities could be used to pay for school infrastructure
or teachers’ salaries, such as in 1884 when Indian Superintendent Walton for the
northern superintendency at Sault Ste. Marie encouraged the Temogamingue
Band to use one dollar per capita of their annuity money toward the salary of a
schoolteacher.52 Annuities could be communally used by First Nations to purchase
livestock, grist or sawmills, or for church repairs or church-related items. Agricultural items in particular were often advanced to First Nations on credit against
future annuities. For example, the Water Hen Band councillors in 1882 asked for a
cow to be provided, which they would collectively pay for out of their annuities,53
and the Pas Band in 1899 bought a team of horses “by an assessment on their
annuity money.” 54 Annuities could also be placed into special student accounts for
Aboriginal children, which they could then access in a lump sum, with interest,
upon graduation.55
On other occasions, Indian agents may have withheld annuities or otherwise
coerced the use of annuities for agricultural- or educational-related purposes. For
example, in 1887, Indian Agent Pither forced the Little Forks Reserve to pay
for the keep of their cattle by withholding their annuities,56 and in 1893 fines for
absenteeism of children from the schools appear to have been levied against the
Parry Island Band annuities.57 Annuities could thus be used by government as
economic punishment or incentive in an attempt to control behaviour.
The most evident example of this occurred after the North-West Rebellion of
1885, when annuities were withheld from those First Nations thought to have
participated. The withholding of annuities was initially justified in order to pay
for damages from looting,58 but soon became a tool of punishment and reward
for subsequent behaviour. Indian agents reinstated annuities on a case-by-case
basis as a reward to those who showed “practical evidence of sincere contrition,
furnished by cheerful application to the pursuit of industry.”59 Discretion was
used in the determination of whose annuities to reinstate as a means to encourage
others to follow their good example. Annuities were also withheld or deducted
from individuals in response to damages or thefts, such as in the case of alleged
cattle killings.60 Other examples include annuities being withheld in cases of
polygamy; from those who had deserted their wives and children (often to help
pay for their support61); from those refusing to take part in statutory labour (e.g.,
road building); for those who were thought to have been overpaid (as a result of
double counting or changes to the policies or practices of determining eligibility);
and as an incentive to encourage residency on the reserves.
The annuity policy came under attack from time to time by Indian Affairs
officials as being outmoded and too expensive. Enough time had passed between
the signing of Treaty 7 in 1877 and Treaty 8 in 1899 that the question of the
best method of payment, annuity versus one-time lump sum, was again debated
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in earnest. As earlier, arguments for and against the annuity were made both in
the context of government expenses and Aboriginal welfare. The Hudson’s Bay
Company (HBC), missionaries, and First Nations themselves consistently lobbied
government for a treaty as a means to assist First Nations maintain a livelihood
in the years leading up to Treaty 8. These lands, however, were not required
for settlement in the same way as more southern arable lands had been, and the
government remained reluctant to make a treaty, arguing that the HBC maintained
a responsibility to assist First Nations in times of need. When government finally
decided to make a treaty, Secretary of Indian Affairs J. A. Macrae argued that the
rationalization for the perpetual annuity in the early 1870s, “when the Indians
were looked upon as a disappearing race,” no longer applied, and that a single
payment of, for example, one hundred dollars each would be more appealing for
signatories.62 Ultimately, however, the decision to maintain the smaller perpetual
annuity was made in consideration of future generations.63
Government proved more than willing to put aside its assimilationist goals
out of economic expediency when it came to treaty-making in areas where game
was still thought to be plentiful or where agricultural opportunities were limited.
In some cases, government proved reluctant to sign treaties at all in areas where
it was felt that First Nations could continue to live off the land with a minimum
of interference, and in other cases government was practical in its support of
a hunting economy, even if that seemed counterintuitive to its assimilationist
policies.64 Treaty commissioners, beginning with Treaty 3, included provisions
for ammunition and twine, as well as agricultural implements and cattle, in order
to support existing hunting economies. References can also be found in government records to the annuity as a means of support for traditional economies.65
Certainly education, agricultural settlement, and assimilation through such
means as enfranchisement remained fundamental goals of the government’s
Indian administration. There is considerable evidence that government often
thought of the annuity as a necessary but temporary measure of welfare support
until such time as First Nations could become self-reliant. And this was in spite
of the language of metaphor about the treaties and the annuity lasting as long
as the sun shines and the water runs. A report from the treaty commissioner’s
office in Winnipeg, dated months after the signing of Treaty 3, recommended that
temporary instead of permanent annuities be adopted for a future treaty because
certain bands “are already sufficiently civilized … that in fifteen or twenty years,
if not sooner, they will be able to do without assistance from Government.”66
The notion of the role of treaty, and of the annuity, as livelihood assistance
until eventual assimilation into the broader society, when such assistance may
no longer be required, is most evident in the policies of enfranchisement and
withdrawal of treaty to take up Métis scrip. The idea that First Nations needed
to eventually assimilate remained at the forefront of Aboriginal policy development in the nineteenth century, and was reflected in the enfranchisement provisions of the Gradual Civilization Act of 1857, the Gradual Enfranchisement Act
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of 1869, and the amalgamated Indian Acts of 1868 and 1876. Under this policy,
individuals were considered wards of the state until enfranchised, either voluntarily or mandatorily, and the process of becoming full Canadian citizens included
being able to live without treaty-based assistance. Beginning with the Gradual
Civilization Act, individual males over twenty-one years of age could apply for
voluntary enfranchisement, and if successful, their wives and children would be
enfranchised along with them.67 Applicants, who were extremely rare, first had to
meet certain criteria designed to ensure that they would be able to live without
government or treaty assistance; for example, that they were formally educated
and free of debt.
Beginning with the Gradual Enfranchisement Act, and replicated in the Indian
Act of 1876, women who married non-treaty Indian men were enfranchised and
could, upon their request and approval by their First Nation, be provided with a
one-time payment of ten years’ worth of annuities, referred to as commutation.
Between 1879 and 1894 there were a total of 182 commutations,68 but this number
increased substantially after 1920 when the power to refuse commutation was
removed from First Nations in order that “unprogressive bands” could no longer
prevent their members from gaining “full citizenship.” 69 While the enfranchisement and commutation policy may have been perceived as a way to ultimately
reduce the annual treaty expenditure, it was also true that women who married
outside of treaty were then not considered to be in the same need of treaty-based
assistance.70
Government policy regarding Métis in the nineteenth century was, in accordance with the Manitoba Act of 1870, to provide Métis heads of households with
a one-time allotment of land or money referred to as scrip, in place of negotiating land rights with a collectivity.71 Government, however, was often prepared to
make a distinction between those Métis who had adopted an “Indian way of life,”
and those who had not—the former being permitted to join treaty if they so chose, 72
while the latter were not considered to be in need of the same treaty assistance
as First Nations. Amendments to the Indian Act in 1879 allowed for individuals,
often men on behalf of their families, to withdraw from treaty to take up scrip.
Initially, the amount of scrip was to be reduced by the amount of annuities already
received, but this provision was amended in 1886 such that individuals could
take scrip without first paying back their annuities. This legislative amendment
resulted in many communities losing a large portion of their members through the
taking up of scrip. One official in Manitoba, for example, reported of the Duck
Bay Reserve that “all the members of this band withdrew from treaty excepting
a few families who removed to Pine Creek,”73 and another reported that “the idea
of leaving the treaty and receiving scrip in compensation for annuity … spread
almost like an epidemic.” 74
Indian Affairs officials maintained a right of refusal for discharges from
treaty based on whether it was felt that the individual or family in question was
sufficiently self-reliant to live without the government annuity and other treaty
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benefits.75 The report for the District of Alberta in 1887, in justification of the
large numbers that had been allowed to withdraw from treaty, stated: “None were
permitted to withdraw, however, unless the Agent and the Inspector of Indian
Agencies were satisfied that they could support themselves without assistance
from the Government.” 76 The report goes on to indicate, however, that “in very
many of these cases [to date] it was injudicious to give them [treaty signatories] a
discharge, as they proved to be quite incapable of earning their own livelihood, and
some of them have applied and have been re-admitted into treaty.” Requests for
withdrawal from treaty were more carefully considered once government began
to fear growing poverty among those not covered by treaty-based assistance. An
Indian agent’s report of the Scrip Commission’s consideration of withdrawals in
the Treaty 6 area assured that “none but those who would support themselves
and families in the future were discharged.”77 These examples of enfranchisement
and leaving treaty to take up Métis scrip clearly demonstrate that government
perceived the annuity and other treaty benefits as essential livelihood assistance
for many treaty signatories.
In order to help contextualize the economic importance of the annuity at the
time the treaties were signed, some evidence for the price of goods and salaries
was compiled. A five-dollar annuity in 1850 could have bought over 160 pounds
of flour or 50 pounds of pork,78 and in 1871 could have bought 100 pounds of
flour or 30 pounds of beef. 79 Arthur Ray has shown that in 1870 a hunter with a
family could equip himself for the year for about twenty to twenty-five dollars,
the equivalent to an annuity for a family of four or five.80 An annuity of five
dollars for a family of five in the early 1880s was equivalent to about one month’s
wages as either an Aboriginal farm labourer 81 or sawmill worker.82 There is further
evidence from treaty elder testimony that the annuity had important economic
significance for families and communities well into the 1950s.83
The oral evidence from treaty elders, especially from Treaty 4 to Treaty 8, is
remarkably consistent in the view that promises of livelihood assistance were a
primary consideration during treaty negotiations. A continuing right of livelihood
is one of five guiding principles of the understandings of treaty that came out of
extensive elder testimony outlined in the book Treaty Elders of Saskatchewan.84
Likewise, the Treaty and Aboriginal Rights Research group’s years of interviews
with elders in Alberta revealed an overarching belief that the treaties concerned
first and foremost people’s livelihoods.85 The authors of The True Spirit and
Original Intent of Treaty 7 concluded: “That they would be taken care of was the
theme reoccurring throughout the elders’ testimony.”86
Once government made up its mind to clear title to land that was thought to be
useful for settlement or access to resources, its priority was to do so as quickly
and as cheaply as possible. That the welfare of the Aboriginal people living on
these lands was often a secondary consideration can be seen from government’s
inaction in responding to First Nations’ requests for treaty as a means of livelihood assistance, until such time as the land was deemed to be of value for settleThis is an excerpt from "Volume 7: A History of Treaties and Policies" in the Aboriginal Policy Research Series, © Thompson Educational Publishing, Inc., 2013
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ment or natural resource use.87 To discount livelihood assistance as a significant
consideration for government leading up to, during, and after treaty negotiations,
however, is to also discount a large body of evidence to this effect.
Assurances of ongoing government livelihood assistance were consistently
sought by First Nations, and often made by government representatives. The
historical record shows that Aboriginal signatories had expectations of being
looked after, and historians and others have aptly demonstrated that government’s
subsequent policies and practices sadly had an opposite effect.88 The message of
livelihood assistance was used as an incentive in treaty negotiations, but did not
always have the desired effect for more northern First Nations who continued to
make a living through traditional means. Some nations in the Treaty 8 area, for
example, “did not want to take treaty, as they had no trouble in making their own
living.”89 Most, however, were not only receptive to the message of livelihood
assistance, but repeatedly asked for clarification of government’s assurances.

Gifting, Feasting, and Renewal
It is important to understand something of the larger historical and cultural context
in which the annuity was introduced. Prior to treaty relations with the government, many First Nations had alliances of trade with fur traders, some had military
alliances with early colonial governments, and all likely had alliances and trading
relations of one kind or another with each other. These alliances had a tradition
of gift-giving and reciprocity in common, referred to by some scholars as gift or
forest diplomacy. Much of the traditional ceremony and First Nation practice of
gift-giving was adopted and actively practiced by fur traders and colonial governments. The regular, often annual, gift-giving signalled a renewal of alliances and
trading relationships. This section will examine the perception of the annuity as
an important annual renewal of the treaty relationship. Along with gift-giving,
feasting was also of great ceremonial importance for First Nations in cementing
and renewing relationships between nations, and the provision of treaty rations
at treaty events will also be briefly examined as possible treaty renewal. There
is considerable evidence that the treaty, rather than a once-for-all unchanging
agreement between treaty parties, was in fact often considered by First Nations
to be a fluid or living agreement that could be modified over time. The annuity
payments represented a renewal of the agreement and a time when grievances
could be voiced and treaty terms reconsidered.
Some early examples of alliances between First Nations and European
newcomers include French fur trade alliances with the Huron, the Algonquin, and
the Montagnais (or Innu), and Dutch and later British alliances with the Iroquois
nations. It was essential that all of these alliances included not only an initial giftgiving ceremony, but periodic ceremonial reaffirmation or renewal of relations.
The Dutch, and later the British, adapted to Iroquois customs of diplomacy,
commonly referred to as the “Covenant Chain.” This involved a complex process
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of renewal that included regular distribution of gifts to chiefs, warriors, and
their dependants.90 In 1756, Sir William Johnson was given responsibility to
promote and augment the British military alliance with the Six Nations League of
Iroquois. Johnson was successful in this by following elaborate Iroquoian custom
and ceremony that involved the exchange of wampum belts and distribution of
presents, also included as compensation to wounded Iroquois warriors and their
families. In fact, Johnson became somewhat of a recognized expert in First Nation
diplomatic practices, and actively advocated for the use of wampum belts, distribution of presents, and specifically the need for renewal of existing treaties.91
When the concept of annuities first became a reality in Canada in 1818, there
had long been an established practice of gift diplomacy that continued to exist
alongside the provision of annuities. After 1812, these diplomatic practices turned
into formal distribution of annual presents made at specified times and locations
for First Nations on both sides of the border who had been loyal to the British
during conflict with the Americans. This distribution was part of a trend that began
with colonial adaptations to Aboriginal diplomatic practices. The early FrenchFirst Nation military and trade alliances were continued by the British after the
fall of New France and the Pontiac uprising of 1760.
The annual presents as a means of maintaining and honouring military alliance
and the annuities as compensation for land, while occasionally confused by
British colonial administrators, were mostly recognized as serving two distinct
purposes. In fact, chiefs insisted that government keep the two items separate for
fear that officials would try to use the same annual payments to honour different
obligations, especially given government attempts to curtail the annual present
as a cost-cutting measure.92 It is nevertheless apparent that the annual present
and the annuity could be made up of the same types of goods,93 and could even
on occasion be distributed at the same time and location.94 What is important for
this discussion is that the concept of an annual payment for the pre-Confederation
Upper Canada treaties fit well within an overall trend that saw the continuation of
an Aboriginal tradition of treaty or relationship renewal.
Evidence that the annuity payments followed a tradition of gift diplomacy is
even more prevalent for the post-Confederation Numbered Treaties, which were
made in the context of long-standing fur trade relations. Fur traders were long
accustomed to adapting to Aboriginal practices of regular renewal of relationships
through the giving of gifts. Fur traders and First Nations over time negotiated
social protocols and practices that were deeply rooted in Aboriginal concepts of
renewal and reciprocity. Many of the fur trade practices would in turn come to
inform the treaty relationship, and it is of interest to note that the annuity itself was
sometimes referred to in negotiations as a “gift.” 95 Alexander Morris explained
his distribution of presents at Fort Ellice in 1876 as being “in conformity with the
custom prevailing here, descending from the Hudson’s Bay Company’s rule.” 96
There are also examples where HBC-First Nation gift diplomacy found expression in treaty terms, such as the suit of clothing given to chiefs and headmen.97
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The HBC traditionally looked after provisioning First Nations for the hunt as
part and parcel of their economic interests, as well as providing rations, often as
advances on credit, in order to assist certain families over winter or through other
difficult times. When the government purchased the Hudson’s Bay Company
Charter in 1870, there was an expectation that they had also inherited the responsibility for providing relief to Aboriginal families in times of need. The fact that
many of the Numbered Treaties were negotiated around the question of government responsibility for looking after First Nations in times of need harkens back
to these fur trade relations. As fur traders often advanced goods on credit to
assist certain families over winter, so government officials often advanced goods
against future annuities, also to assist families over winter.98 In this way, the
treaties continued and further formalized for First Nations what had been ongoing
relations of mutual benefit that had evolved out of the fur trade.99 The perception
of continuity in this regard was helped by the fact that HBC personnel continued
to play a significant role during treaty negotiations and treaty implementation,
including occasionally assisting with the annuity payment.100
Feasting was closely associated with gift-giving, and was another Aboriginal
traditional practice of relationship renewal that found expression first with fur
traders and later as part of the treaty relationship.101 There are many references
in the historical record to the necessity of government “rations” or “provisions”
during negotiations, or later as part of treaty implementation. These rations or
provisions were sometimes made in the context of relief, harkening back to the
HBC practice of providing relief, but more often were made in response to First
Nation expectations of protocol. One of the demands of the Saulteaux during the
1870 season of the Treaty 3 negotiations, in exchange for a right-of-way across
their lands, was to be provided with sufficient goods in order to have a feast each
year at the annuity payment.102 Evidence for feasting and requests for provisions for feasting can be found throughout implementation of the annuity. The
lack or poor quality of rations at treaty payments often became a major cause of
complaint, and was in itself considered by First Nations to be a significant breach
of treaty terms. Some even refused to accept the annuity until such time as satisfactory rations had arrived.103 The symbolic and ceremonial importance of certain
treaty items in the context of relationship renewal, such as provisions for feasting
or the giving of suits of clothing, flags, and medals to chiefs, should not be underestimated.104 Time and again complaints about these items were at the heart of
much of the dissatisfaction expressed over non-fulfilment of treaty terms.
An analysis of the annuity adds to an already large body of literature demonstrating that First Nations perceived the treaties quite differently than government.
For government, the treaties were once-for-all land transactions that bound both
parties to certain ongoing obligations. These obligations were fixed in place by the
written terms of the treaty. First Nations traditions did not include such a concept
of obligations being bound-up in the unchanging words on a page.105 For First
Nations, the treaties were sacred agreements made in the presence of the Creator,
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which could also not be broken once they were made. This, however, did not
mean that the agreements could not be adjusted as circumstances might warrant.
For First Nations, the treaty terms were fluid, rather than fixed, and there was an
expectation that terms could be discussed and reviewed as part of an annual treaty
renewal.106
There is considerable evidence, for example, of First Nations refusing to accept
the annuity, which was interpreted as a protest in order to draw attention to their
particular claim or grievance. This was likely more than a simple show of dissatisfaction, however. To not accept the annuity was a refusal to renew the treaty
relationship, and on some level represented an attempt to renegotiate the relationship.107 The Pembina, Portage La Prairie, and St. Peter’s bands all refused their
annuity in the early 1870s over the so-called “outside promises” issue of Treaties
1 and 2.108 There are reports of at least fifteen instances in the Indian Affairs
Annual Reports alone of First Nations and chiefs refusing to accept annuities, and
constant attempts to renegotiate aspects of the treaty.109 In 1884, Indian Inspector
Wadsworth for Treaty 6 wrote about grievances being voiced during annuity
payment periods: “It is the occasion in the year upon which they feel bound to
mention them [grievances], as again receiving the money is looked upon by them
as a ratification of the treaty.”110 The refusal to accept the annuity, in these terms,
was thus a refusal to ratify the treaty for a given time.
Ultimately, refusal to accept the annuity and other means of attempting to
review and renegotiate aspects of the treaty that were not satisfactory to First
Nations, speak strongly to a belief that the terms of the treaties would be periodically reviewed and could be altered. Rather than representing the starting point
for the relationship and its primary defining attribute, the treaty document may
be more accurately understood from a First Nation perspective as one component
of a longer relationship continuum that began with the elaborate commercial
compacts of the fur trade.111 Historian James Morrison argued that the Ojibwa
viewed the Robinson Treaties as an “open contract,” with use of the term “ChiDebahk-(In)-Nee-Gay-Win.”112 There is further linguistic evidence that the Cree
word for “treaty” had the meaning to “weigh and measure” the relationship,
which included review of the annuity payment itself.113 Cardinal and Hildebrandt,
in their analysis of elders’ testimony in Saskatchewan, concluded that “the initial
treaty process was to provide a framework within which further arrangements
arising from the agreement to live together was to be discussed in subsequent
treaty negotiations.”114

The Treaty Annuity in a Modern Context
The treaty annuity in a modern context is more than representative of ongoing
mutual obligations, but is seen by many First Nations as a renewal of the treaty
relationship—a relationship that continues to define much of the political landscape
in terms of Aboriginal issues across Canada. Nevertheless, as much as the annual
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payment may be perceived as an important symbolic renewal of a relationship and
as outwardly representative of all of government’s treaty promises of livelihood
assistance, there are those who find the distribution of four or five dollars a year
to be demeaning if not unethical.115 There have been a number of calls to revisit
the historic treaties and to revitalize or modernize the historic treaty relationship.
First Nations have stated that the treaties were intended to provide for a new
economic base, given that they had been deprived of their traditional one.116 The
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) report, noting that the annuity
payment was regarded as a formal opportunity to discuss and renew the relationship each year, argued that the treaties need to be flexible enough to address new
concerns of an evolving relationship. The RCAP report goes on to recommend
that a formal process of revitalization be established, and that this process include
a reconsideration of the “treaty promises of wealth transfer.”117
The issue of modernization or indexation of the treaty amount has been raised
in different contexts: in treaty elder testimony, through the media and other means
of political lobby, under court challenge, and in the research papers of Robert
Metcs, Jean Allard, and John Richards. Metcs makes a persuasive argument, using
the legal underpinnings of the Marshall decision, that the only way to make sense
of the “common intention” of treaty parties regarding the annuity is to assume
that the Crown, rather than the First Nations, accepted all the risks associated with
potential future inflation and congruent devaluation of the annuity. The annuity
was meant to be a significant contribution to livelihood, he argues, and the Crown,
believing the currency to be relatively stable, was prepared to provide annually
into the future the buying power of the dollar amount at the time the treaties
were signed. By way of comparison, he concludes that the very same arguments
of justness and fairness that lead to Canada’s modifications to old-age pensions
commensurate with inflation should also be applied to the treaty annuity.118
Allard is very critical of the government’s handling of Indian affairs, specifically of what he sees as rampant misspending of funds on misguided welfare
programs and perpetuation of a reserve system that encourages abuses of power
from chief and council. The solution, he argues, has been there all along in the
provisions of the historic treaties. For Allard, a large individualized annuity
benefit represents an opportunity to empower individuals and establish responsible First Nation governance structures.119 This notion has been picked up and
further developed by John Richards of the C. D. Howe Institute. Richards argues
that transfer payments to First Nations on reserve not only create unhealthy or
corrupt governance, but also act as a disincentive for individuals to leave the
reserves. Providing individualized benefits to band members, while at the same
time reducing band transfers, he argues, would first empower individuals to make
a real choice of where to live, and also help create accountability on reserve via the
creation of taxation structures.120 It is not at all clear, however, that First Nations
would welcome a reduction of band transfers in favour of individual benefits, as
this may be viewed by some as a further erosion of communal-based Aboriginal
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Table 5.1: Estimated 2007 Value of Original Annuity Amount, Adjusted for the Consumer
Price Index, for Major Treaty and Adhesion Dates
Signing Dates

# of First
Nations

Annuity
Amount

CPI Adjusted
Amount

1871

16

$5

$100.32

Treaty 3

1873–1875

26

$5

$85.51

Treaty 4

1874–1877

33

$5

$86.29

Treaty 5

1875–1876

21

$5

$84.40

Treaty 5

1908–1910

17

$5

$91.52

Treaty 6

1876–1882

36

$5

$85.18

Treaty 6

1889–1898

5

$5

$91.41

Treaty 7

1877

7

$5

$83.40

Treaty 8

1899–1900

38

$5

$92.69

Treaty 9

1905

9

$4

$72.28

Treaty 9

1906

11

$4

$77.85

Treaty 9

1929–1930

11

$5

$58.90

Treaty 10

1906

5

$5

$97.31

Treaty 10

1907

2

$5

$89.85

Treaty 11

1921

19

$5

$54.45

Treaty 11

1922

2

$5

$59.46

Treaty
Treaties 1 & 2

cultural norms. Allard had proposed an increase of the annuity amount from five
dollars to five thousand dollars, while Richards proposed halving this amount. But
what is the real value of the annuity amount indexed to today’s cost of living?
Stewart Clatworthy has estimated a measure of cost of living change over
the life span of the treaties using the consumer price index (CPI) and wholesale
price index. Calculations were made based on the original signing dates of the
Numbered Treaties, and some of the more important adhesion dates, when First
Nations signed on to an existing treaty at a later date. Calculations are not included
for the Robinson Treaties because of a lack of a reliable measure of price change
for Canada prior to 1867. Official CPI estimates of cost of living changes only
exist from 1914 to 2007. Statistics Canada has, however, developed estimates
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of wholesale prices and related indices since 1867. Clatworthy has established
a measure of Canadian price change from 1867 to 2007 by splicing the general
wholesale price index (excluding gold) for the 1867–1914 period to the 1914–
2007 CPI series.121 Table 5.1 contains the CPI adjusted amount in 2007 dollars
for the major treaty signing and adhesion dates. In 1871 or 1906, five dollars is
estimated to have been equivalent to about one hundred dollars in 2007.

Conclusion
An analysis of the terms, implementation, and perceptions of the annuity payment
provides a window on which to view some of the fundamentals of the historic
treaty relationship—namely the extent of livelihood assistance intended, and
view of the treaties as “living” and evolving arrangements. The annuity policy
was initially adopted as both a cost-cutting measure and as a means to promote
First Nation welfare and encourage assimilation. Government clearly viewed the
annuity as a significant economic expenditure and benefit,122 attempting to limit
the cost in relation to the perceived value of the land, and using it to fund its civilization program. The annuity was expected to help certain families over difficult
times, just as the HBC had provided livelihood assistance prior to the treaties.
Annuities were used as assistance in the transition from a hunting to an agrarian
economy, or to supplement more traditional livelihood pursuits, depending on the
circumstances. Ultimately, many government officials considered the annuity to
be a necessary but temporary welfare measure until First Nations became enfranchised.
First Nations, on the other hand, were able to negotiate an annuity greater than
what government was initially willing to provide, and were led to believe that
the annuity and other treaty terms would be of significant economic benefit for
themselves and future generations. Far from a means of temporary support on the
way to becoming enfranchised, the annuity represented for many First Nations
an annual renewal of nation-to-nation agreements. An annual payment fit well
with the Aboriginal practice and concept of renewal that was an important part
of early military alliances and later fur trade relations. Evidence is strong in both
the historic written record of treaty implementation and First Nation elder oral
testimony that, from the First Nation perspective, the treaties were part of a living
and evolving relationship. In this conception of the relationship, the treaty terms
were not bound by the written word, but could be reviewed and renegotiated from
time to time. In attempts to renegotiate aspects of the treaty, First Nations often
refused to renew the relationship by refusing to accept the annuity.
Today, many of the 369 Treaty First Nations in Canada view a renewal and
revitalization of the treaty relationship as long overdue. The lack of a common
understanding of the treaty terms has led to deep feelings of mistrust that impact
virtually all aspects of the modern relationship. Cardinal and Hildebrandt, in their
summary of elder testimony, conclude that “the livelihood arrangements of treaty

This is an excerpt from "Volume 7: A History of Treaties and Policies" in the Aboriginal Policy Research Series, © Thompson Educational Publishing, Inc., 2013
To order copies of this volume, visit www.thompsonbooks.com or call 1-877-366-2763.

APR Volume 7.indb 91

1/13/10 12:13:46 PM

92  /  Part One: Historic Treaties and Modern Meaning

must be the basis for bringing back on track the treaty relationship.”123 That the
annuity and other treaty terms have not been effective as livelihood assistance is
clear from the disparity that exists today between Treaty First Nations and other
Canadians. A study of treaty annuities helps to underscore the importance of both
historic and modern-day treaty renewal and the need to come to a mutually acceptable understanding on the question of treaty livelihood assistance.
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Endnotes
1 According to the consumer price index, five dollars in 1913—when the Big Island Lake Cree
Nation adhered to Treaty 6—would be worth close to one hundred dollars in 2007.
2 See John Milloy, The Era of Civilization—British Policy for the Indians of Canada, 1830–1860,
for a discussion of the transition from a policy of “conciliation,” which began in 1763 with the
Royal Proclamation, to a policy of “civilization” beginning c.1830.
3 The first annuity provisions may have appeared in a 1752 Halifax Treaty with the Shubenacadie
band of Mi’kmaq in the form of promised regular gift distributions; see Dickason, Canada’s First
Nations, p. 179. Also, Lord Selkirk had purchased lands in Manitoba from the Saulteaux in 1817
for an annual amount of tobacco; see Alexander Morris, The Treaties of Canada with the Indians
of Canada and the North West Territories, p. 15.
4 See, in particular, John F. Leslie and Betsey Baldwin, “Indian Treaty Annuities: The Historical
Evolution of Government Policy, from Colonial Times to Treaty 3.”
5 Ibid., pp. 36, 166. In 1820 it was calculated that ninety-eight thousand acres sold would yield
enough interest to cover the annuity payments to date; see Gates, Land Policies of Upper Canada,
159. See also Robert J. Surtees, “Indian Land Cessions in Ontario, 1763–1862: The Evolution of
a System,” p. 30, 174–175; Robert J. Surtees, “Land Cessions, 1763–1830,” pp. 112–113; Joan
Holmes and Associates, “Land Cession Treaties and Reserve Surrenders in Pre-Confederation
Ontario, Volume I,” pp. 63–64, 110–111; and Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens: A History of
Indian-White Relations in Canada, p. 117.
6 Lillian Gates, Land Policies of Upper Canada, p. 159.
7 Leslie and Baldwin, p. 166.
8 Surtees, “Indian Land Cessions in Ontario, 1763–1862,” p. 30, 185.
9 Schoolcraft, Indian Agent at Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan, as quoted in Leslie and Baldwin, 28.
Perpetual annuities were replaced by temporary annuities beginning in 1816 due to a prevailing
view among American government and humanitarian groups that perpetual annuities led to an
unhealthy dependence on government; see Leslie and Baldwin, pp. 29–31.
10 Ibid., p. 36.
11		 Ibid., p. 36.
12 See, for example, Dorothy V. Jones, “British Colonial Indian Treaties,” and Jean Friesen,
“Magnificent Gifts: The Treaties of Canada with the Indians of the Northwest, 1869–70.”
13 The Algonkian Nations, for example, first educated the French and later the British in the importance of gift-giving in human interaction; see Catherine Sims, Algonkian-British Relations in the
Upper Great Lakes Region, pp. 2–8.
14 Proposals were also made to limit the annuity expenditure, such as to introduce a cap on the
amount payable, to pay in cash instead of goods (in order to limit transportation and storage
costs), and to limit eligibility.
15 Editor’s note: Eventually (1855) presents were discontinued for several reasons, including the
cost involved. More information can be found in: Her Majesty’s Indian Allies: British Indian
Policy in the Defence of Canada, 1774–1815, by Robert S. Allen, American Council of Learned
Societies (edition published by Dundurn Press Ltd., 1992).
16 Leslie and Baldwin, p. 66; see also Milloy, The Era of Civilization, pp. 63, 81–97. The annual
presents were discontinued in 1858.
17 Holmes and Associates, “Land Cession Treaties, Volume I,” p. 63.
18 All Upper Canada treaty annuities were capitalized at Confederation such that annuity interest,
along with the interest from the sale of land and timber, was paid semi-annually; see “Report of
the Deputy Superintendent General,” August 15, 1922, in the Annual Report of the Department
of Indian Affairs, p. 7.
19 James Morrison, “The Robinson Treaties of 1850: A Case Study,” p. 30; Leslie and Baldwin, p.
70.
20 Leslie and Baldwin, pp. 138, 146, 169; Wayne Daugherty, “Treaty Research Report: Treaty
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Three,” not paginated; Joan Holmes and Associates, “Treaty Research Report—Treaty 3 (1873),”
p. 14; Morris, p. 62.
21 Report of the Indian Commissioner’s Office, Winnipeg, December 31, 1873, in the Annual Report
of the Department of the Interior, 1874, p. 55; Report of the Indian Office Winnipeg, October 22,
1873, in the Annual Report of the Department of the Interior, 1874, p. 61; Chief Henry Prince to
Minister of the Interior, September 26, 1874, as quoted in Dolores Vader, “Treaty Annuities,” p.
27. Less generous treaty terms were either considered or ultimately offered as part of Treaties 3,
5, 8, 9, and 10, because the land was deemed to be of lesser value.
22 Arthur J. Ray, Jim Miller, and Frank Tough, Bounty and Benevolence: A History of Saskatchewan
Treaties, p. 74; Frank Tough, “As Their Natural Resources Fail,” p. 90.
23 See Robert Metcs, “The Common Intention of the Parties and the Payment of Annuities under
the Numbered Treaties,” pp. 44–46, 60, for the view that annuities were meant to be a significant
contribution to livelihood, whether traditional or agricultural.
24 The British government at this time also began to be suffused with a new liberalism that led,
for example, to the abolishment of the slave trade; see Robert J. Surtees, “The Development of
an Indian Reserve Policy in Canada” and “Indian Land Cessions in Ontario, 1763–1862,” and
Holmes and Associates, “Land Cession Treaties, Volume I,” p. 46.
25 Leslie and Baldwin, p. 48.
26 Ibid., pp. 48–50; and Holmes and Associates, “Land Cession Treaties, Volume I,” pp. 45–50,
112.
27 Report of Committee No. 4, on Indian Department, published within the Bagot Commission
Report, as quoted in Leslie and Baldwin, p. 61.
28 Historical evidence of treaty negotiations is relatively lacking for Treaty 2.
29 Leslie and Baldwin, p. 98.
30 The Manitoban, August 12, 1871, in Leslie and Baldwin, pp. 122–128; the initial amount authorized was twelve dollars for a family of five or like proportion.
31 Leslie and Baldwin, p. 106.
32 Ibid., pp. 144–145; and Holmes and Associates, “Treaty Research Report—Treaty 3 (1873),” p.
23.
33 See Ray, Miller, and Tough, pp. 83–85 for a discussion of First Nation expectations regarding
annuities.
34 Friesen, “Magnificent Gifts,” p. 207.
35 The Manitoban, August 12, 1871, as quoted in Leslie and Baldwin, pp. 123–124.
36 Morris to the Minister, October 14, 1873 as quoted in Leslie and Baldwin, p. 146.
37 The Manitoban, August 12, 1871, as quoted in Leslie and Baldwin, pp. 169–170. See also Ray,
Miller, and Tough, p. 78 for evidence of the suggestion that annuities would secure a livelihood
for signatories.
38 Simpson to Howe, November 3, 1871, as quoted in Leslie and Baldwin, p. 129.
39 As quoted in Ray, Miller, and Tough, p. 68.
40 The Manitoban, October 18, 1873, as quoted in Leslie and Baldwin, p. 149.
41 The language of kinship, such as the “Great White Mother” (the Queen) and her “Indian children,”
was used often in treaty negotiations to indicate the notion of protection—both in the sense of
physical protection (e.g., from settlers or traders of liquor) and material assistance; see Friesen,
“Magnificent Gifts,” p. 208.
42 Morris, p. 61; this statement was made in an attempt to explain the relative advantage of having
a perpetual annuity over the annuity practice in the United States of providing a larger amount,
but over a limited period of time, such as for twenty years.
43 Ibid., pp. 96, 117.
44 Ibid., p. 204.
45 Ibid., p. 211.
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46 Report on the Manitoba Superintendency, November 28, 1882, in the Indian Affairs (IA) Annual
Report, 1882, p. 143; Report of the Northern Superintendency, Ontario, August 31, 1889, in the
IA Annual Report, 1889, p. 5; Report from Manitoba and the North-West Territories, November
20, 1897, in the IA Annual Report, 1897, p. 215; see also Tough, p. 90.
47 Report from the Manitoba Superintendency, Rat Portage Inspectorate, July 27, 1901, in the IA
Annual Report, 1901, p. 113.
48 Report of the Indian Commissioner’s Office, Winnipeg, October 30, 1875, in the IA Annual
Report, 1875, p. 37.
49 IA Annual Report, 1891, p. xvii.
50 Report of the Blood Agency, Macleod, Alberta, August 8, 1890, in the IA Annual Report, 1895,
p. 75.
51 Report of the Indian Commissioner, Manitoba and North-West Territories, November 20, 1897,
in the IA Annual Report, 1897, p. 215.
52 Report of the Northern Superintendency-Division No. 2., August 26, 1884, in the IA Annual
Report, 1884, p. 9.
53 Report of the Agency of Mr. Martineau, Winnipeg, July 26, 1882, in the IA Annual Report, 1882,
p. 149.
54 Report of the Manitoba Superintendency, Portage la Prairie, September 15, 1899, in the IA
Annual Report, 1899, p. 97.
55 Report of the Indian Commissioner, Regina, N.W.T., December 1, 1891, in the IA Annual Report,
1891, p. 201.
56 Report of the Coutcheching Agency, July 29, 1887, in the IA Annual Report, 1887, p. 66.
57 Report of Parry Sound, August 28, 1893, in the IA Annual Report, 1893, p. 7.
		 Editor’s note: It is interesting to note that annuities were reinstated after a three-year period
(1888) when DIA decided that the punishment was sufficient and there was growing evidence
that that more harm was being done by withholding the annuities.
58 Report of Manitoba and the North-West Territories, November 17, 1886, in the IA Annual Report,
1886, p. 106; Memo from Lawrence Vankoughnet to John A. Macdonald, August 17, 1885, as
quoted in Vader, p. 64.
59 Report of Hayter Reed, Commissioner, Regina, N.W.T., October 31, 1888, in the IA Annual
Report, 1888, p. 124.
60 In one case annuities were even withheld because of children who had allegedly stolen biscuits
from the local missionary; see the Report of Coutcheching Agency—Treaty No. 3, August 9,
1887, in the IA Annual Report, 1888, p. 53.
61 This was first legislated under the Gradual Enfranchisement Act, 1869.
62 As quoted in Dennis F. K. Madill, “Treaty Research Report: Treaty Eight,” not paginated.
63 Ibid.
64 See, for example, Kenneth S. Coates, “Treaty Research Report: Treaty No. 10.” In 1884 Deputy
Superintendent General Vankoughnet argued, in the context of applicable game laws, that if First
Nations were prevented from hunting for subsistence purposes, they would then have to be fed
by government; Joan Holmes and Associates, “Treaty Research Report—Treaties 1 & 2,” p. 47.
See also Tough, p. 90 for the view that annuities were “a means to maintain Indian labour in a
commercial hunting economy.”
65 See, for example, report from Dewdney to Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, January 1,
1882, in the IA Annual Report, 1881, p. 38. Morris, p. 75, indicated that instead of purchasing
items right away, many First Nations kept the money to use as leverage to secure credit from the
HBC.
66 Report of Commissioner J. A. N. Provencher, Winnipeg, December 31, 1873, in IA Annual
Report, 1874, p. 56.
67 Women could also enfranchise voluntarily beginning with the 1876 Indian Act.
68 “Indian Women Who Have Commuted Their Annuity by a Ten Year’s Purchase Under Section 11
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of the Indian Act” in the IA Annual Report, 1894, pp. 358–363.
69 Letter from Deputy Superintendent General Scott to Arthur Meighen, Superintendent General of
Indian Affairs (January 12, 1920), quoted in Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples report,
Vol. 4, p. 29.
70 The broader societal expectation at this time, espoused by Indian Agents, missionaries, and
others, was that men were responsible for the economic welfare of families, and married women
would raise families in places where their husbands could make a living; see the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples report, Vol. 4, p. 28, for a similar view about property rights on
reserve.
71 The only exception to this was the Métis at Rainey Lake, who were included under Treaty 3 at
the insistence of the First Nations.
72 See, for example, the Report from Fort Walsh, Cypress Hills, N.W. Territory, September 12,
1876, in the IA Annual Report, 1876, pp. xxxvii–xxxviii.
73 Report of the Manitoba Superintendency, Winnipeg, December 7, 1886, in the IA Annual Report,
1886, p. 163.
74 Report of the Pas Agency—Treaty No. 5, Cumberland, N.W.T., July 2, 1886, in IA Annual
Report, 1886, p. 76.
75 Editor’s note: There were of course other issues that influenced these decisions, such as band
reactions to post-1885-rebellion Department of Indian Affairs policy.
76 IA Annual Report, 1887, p. liii; see also Report of the Office of the Indian Commissioner for
Manitoba and the North-West Territories, December 23, 1887, p. 113, and Coates, “Treaty
Research Report: Treaty No. 10,” not paginated.
77 Report of Indian Agency—Treaty No. 6, Saddle Lake, N.W.T., June 30, 1887, in the IA Annual
Report, 1887, p. 93; see also Tough, p. 120.
78 Morrison, “The Robinson Treaties of 1850,” p. 124.
79 HBC post records, Red River, as indicated in Leslie and Baldwin, p. 134.
80 Arthur Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade in the Industrial Age, p. 200.
81 Report of the Manitoba Superintendency, Portage la Prairie Agency, December 10, 1881, in the
IA Annual Report, 1881, p. 61.
82 Report of the Office of the Inspector of Indian Agencies, Manitoba Superintendency, November
30, 1883, in the IA Annual Report, 1883, p. 137.
83 Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations and Canada, “Annuities in the Context of Treaty,” p.
14.
84 H. Cardinal and W. Hildebrandt, Treaty Elders of Saskatchewan, p. 36.
85 Lynn Hickey, Richard L. Lightning, and Gordon Lee, “T.A.R.R. Interview with Elders Program,”
pp. 103–160; see also Vader, p. 91.
86 Treaty 7 Elders and Tribal Council with Walter Hildebrandt, Sarah Carter, and Dorothy First
Rider, The True Spirit and Original Intent of Treaty 7, pp. 120–121. See also evidence of Treaty
4 elders’ testimony in John Leonard Taylor, Treaty Research Report: Treaty Six, not paginated.
87 See, for example, Richard Daniel, “The Spirit and Terms of Treaty 8,” and Madill, “Treaty
Research Report: Treaty Eight.”
88 See, for example, Sarah Carter, Lost Harvests.
89 Report from Inspector for Treaty No. 8, October 5, 1903, in the IA Annual Report, 1903, p. 235.
90 Leslie and Baldwin, p. 15; Jones, “British Colonial Indian Treaties;” J. R. Miller, “Compact,
Contract, Covenant: The Evolution of Indian Treaty Making,” pp. 73–75.
91 Holmes and Associates, “Land Cession Treaties, Volume I,” pp. 11–20; Leslie and Baldwin, p.
17; Sims, pp. 10–12.
92 See, for example, Joan Holmes and Associates, “Land Cession Treaties and Reserve Surrenders
in Pre-Confederation Ontario, Volume II: Case Studies,” p. 11; and Leslie and Baldwin, pp.
44–48, 56–68.
93 The Bagot Commission Report in Leslie and Baldwin, pp. 66, 91.
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94 Morrison, “The Robinson Treaties of 1850,” p. 126.
95 See, for example, J. E. Foster, “Indian-White Relations in the Prairie West during the Fur Trade
Period—A Compact?” and Ray, Miller, and Tough; Jean Friesen has emphasized that the traditional annual Aboriginal trade fairs, renewal of peace ceremonies, and other First Nation gatherings fit well with the fur trade annual round, Friesen, “Magnificent Gifts,” p. 210.
96 Morris to Howe, February 26, 1876, as quoted in Leslie and Baldwin. p. 103.
97 Dickieson letter, November 18, 1874, in Vader, p. 34. See also Miller, “Compact, Contract,
Covenant,” p. 85. All of the numbered treaties, except Treaty 9, included provision of a “suitable
suit of clothing” for each chief and between two to four headmen (also referred to as “subordinate officers” or “councillors”) every three years (or annually in the case of Treaty 6). The
annual treaty provision of ammunition and twine may also owe its origin to the HBC practice
of providing ammunition for the hunt; see the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations and
Canada, p. 6. At the close of Treaty 1 negotiations in 1870 Lieutenant-Governor Archibald
distributed ammunition to enable those in attendance to gain a living from hunting over the
coming winter, reminiscent of HBC practices; Morris, 27.
98 The HBC commonly provided hunters in the autumn with goods on credit that were collectively
referred to as “winter outfits,” including ammunition, nets, fishing line, twine, traps, knives etc.;
see A. J. Ray, “Shading a Promise: Interpreting the Livelihood Rights Clauses in NineteenthCentury Canadian Treaties with First Nations.”
99 See especially Ray, Miller, and Tough, p. 74, for the notion that the annuity was a continuation of
a pre-existing HBC responsibility. See also Miller, “Compact, Contract, Covenant,” pp. 70–71,
and Daniel.
100 See, for example, Leslie and Baldwin, pp. 149, 153; Ray, Miller, and Tough, p. 56; and Holmes
and Associates, “Treaty Research Report—Treaty 3 (1873),” p. 35. The connection between the
history and culture of HBC trade relations and relations with government formed under treaty is
examined in detail by Ray, Miller, and Tough in their book Bounty and Benevolence.
101 See, for example, Morrison, “The Robinson Treaties of 1850,” pp. 90–93.
102 Leslie and Baldwin, p. 107, also p. 152 for general Saulteaux expectations of provisions; Morris,
p. 72; Holmes and Associates, “Treaty Research Report—Treaty 3 (1873),” p. 6.
103 See for example the Report from Fort Macleod, August 14, 1880, in the IA Annual Report, 1880,
p. 88; and the Report of the Savanne Agency—Treaty No. 3, August 13, 1886, in the IA Annual
Report, 1886, p. 69.
104 Chief Yellow Quill, for example, in 1874 had indicated that he would refuse the suit of clothes,
flag, and medal offered to him unless government made annuity payment in arrears (i.e., for late
adherents, or those absent during treaty payment); Alexander Morris as quoted in Vader, pp.
41–42.
105 One possible exception may be the Iroquois use of wampum belts.
106 See, for example, Friesen, “Magnificent Gifts” and the RCAP report, Vol. 2, Part One, p. 51.
107 Leslie and Baldwin, p. 170. There is also evidence of a “renewal ceremony” that existed within
the fur trade, whereby a calumet (pipe) was either left at a fort by the First Nation trading captains
or chiefs to indicate contentment, or taken with them to indicate the opposite; see Ray, Miller, and
Tough, pp. 9, 20, and Miller, “Compact, Contract, Covenant,” p. 70.
108 Holmes and Associates, “Treaty Research Report—Treaties 1 & 2,” pp. 28–30; Wayne Daugherty,
“Treaty Research Report: Treaty One and Treaty Two,” not paginated; Leslie and Baldwin, p.
130.
109 Poundmaker, Piapot, and Big Bear all refused annuities in the early 1880s in an attempt to draw
attention to renegotiation of treaty terms; see Morin, “Perceptions of Implementation,” pp. 133–
135 and John Tobias, “Canada’s Subjugation of the Plains Cree, 1879–1885,” p. 232. See also
Vader, p. 56, for Beardy and the Duck Lake Indians’ refusal to take annuities in 1879.
110 Report of Treaty No. 6, August 26, 1884, in the IA Annual Report, 1884, p. 154.
111 Miller, “Compact, Contract, Covenant,” p. 71. There are also examples of First Nations refusing
to accept gifts or provisions prior to treaty, interpreted as chiefs not wanting to be baited into
treaty or otherwise bound to the government; see, for example, Leslie and Baldwin, p. 115, and

This is an excerpt from "Volume 7: A History of Treaties and Policies" in the Aboriginal Policy Research Series, © Thompson Educational Publishing, Inc., 2013
To order copies of this volume, visit www.thompsonbooks.com or call 1-877-366-2763.

APR Volume 7.indb 97

1/13/10 12:13:47 PM

98  /  Part One: Historic Treaties and Modern Meaning
Holmes and Associates, “Treaty Research Report—Treaty 3 (1873),” p. 6.
112 Morrison, “The Robinson Treaties of 1850,” p. 157.
113 Vader, p. 46.
114 Cardinal and Hildebradt, p. 66.
115 “Treaty ceremony draws fire, Payouts trivial, say detractors,” The Winnipeg Sun, June 11, 2008;
“Treaty is a Rip-off,” Cision media transcript, May 7, 2008.
116 See, for example, the Alberta Indian Chiefs quoted in Taylor, “Treaty Research Report: Treaty
Six,” not paginated.
117 RCAP report, Vol. 2, Part One, p. 77.
118 Metcs, “The Common Intention of the Parties and the Payment of Annuities under the Numbered
Treaties.”
119 Jean Allard, “Big Bear’s Treaty: The Road to Freedom,” and Jean Allard, The Rebirth of Big
Bear’s People: The Treaties: A New Foundation for Status Indian Rights in the 21st Century.
120 John Richards, “A New Agenda for Strengthening Canada’s Aboriginal Population: Individual Treaty Benefits, Reduced Transfers to Bands and Own-Source Taxation;” John Richards,
Creating Choices: Rethinking Aboriginal Policy.
121 Clatworthy spliced the two indices together by setting the value of both to 1.00 in 1914. This
method assumes that wholesale and consumer prices are highly correlated; personal correspondence with the author.
122 Between 1868 and 1881 Treaties 1–7 represented 11 percent of all government expenditures in
the territory, and escalating annuity expenses from late adherents was a major concern given the
lack of reliable information on numbers of potential annuitants; Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade in
the Industrial Age, pp. 34–40.
123 Cardinal and Hildebrandt, p. 47.
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